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Abstract 
 
A longitudinal analysis of married physicians labor supply is carried out on Norwegian data 
from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation implies that physicians can choose 
among 10 different job packages which are a combination of part time/full time, 
hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not working. Their current choice is 
influenced by past available options due to a taste persistence parameter in the utility 
function. In the estimation we take into account the budget constraint, including all features of 
the tax system. Our results imply that an overall wage increase or a tax cut moves married 
physicians towards full time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. 
But the overall and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors 
are rather low compared to previous estimates. 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we study what determines the supplied working hours of employed medical 
doctors. In particular, we investigate the choice between working in public and private 
institutions, and between full time and part time contracts. As economists, we tend to think 
that wages are among the most relevant determinants of (physicians’) labor supply. But many 
other relevant features are often neglected by economists. Some have to do with contracts 
characteristics, with sectors, with hours. Some have to do with job satisfaction and motivation. 
In this paper, we model physicians’ labor supply choices taking into account also non-
pecuniary characteristics of different job types. We focus on how changes in wages and 
taxation affect both the overall labour supply and the choice of job-type.  
We estimate a structural labor supply model that allows for choices between types of jobs. 
The physicians are assumed to maximize utility given the budget constraints and given the 
availability of different types of jobs. The jobs differ with respect to the working loads. At 
each point in time physicians can choose between 10 different states which are a combination 
of working full time or part time, working in hospitals or primary care, working in the public 
or private sector and not working. Our model extends the basic multinomial logit model 
applied to panel data5 and it is based on an econometric model developed by Dagsvik (2002). 
In our model, the current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each 
alternative in the past, not only the optimal ones. Thus, we allow for the random parts of the 
utility functions to be correlated across time and types of jobs (taste persistence). This 
behavioural assumption implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal 
choices) matter for current choices.  The model is estimated on transitions between jobs based 
on a panel of 6,564 married employed Norwegian physicians from 1997 to 1999. In our data 
we do not observe self-employed physicians. 
Our paper differs from past literature on physicians’ labour supply because it is the first 
time that a dynamic labor supply model is estimated taking into account choices among job 
types and taste persistence over time. Past literature that has estimated physicians’ labour 
supply is rather different from our framework. Baltagi et al. (2005) estimates a labour supply 
                                                 
5 See for instance Train (2003) or Cameron (2005) 
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of 1303 male physicians employed only in Norwegian hospitals who worked for the whole 
period 1993-1997 and they obtain labor supply elasticities around 0.3. Our paper differs from 
theirs in many respects. The most relevant difference is that we assume that doctors can 
choose between different job types with predetermined number of hours. The reason why we 
do not let physicians work a little more when economic incentives are improved is due to the 
working loads offered by the management in hospital and primary care. There are thus 
institutional constraints on hours worked that we have to consider when calculating the 
responses to economic incentives. 
Saether (2005) utilize a model that is similar to ours but it is a static model estimated on 
data from one year. He finds that a wage increase causes a modest response in total hours and 
a reallocation of hours in favor of the sector with increased wages. Midtunn (2007) analyzes 
the Norwegian physicians’ choice to work only in the private sector. Gjerberg (2001) studies 
physicians’ choice of specialty among female and male Norwegian physicians. Godager et al. 
2009) concentrate their analysis on choices of working hours of 435 Norwegian General 
Practitioners after the reform of 2001 where GP’s became self-employed.  Also Grytten et al. 
(2008) study a particular aspect of the wage structure of Norwegian GP’s:  the effect of 
General Practitioners fees’ changes on their income.  
Labour supply of medical doctors has been studied also in other countries but none of the 
previous studies is similar to ours: Rizzo (1994) analyzes only self-employed physicians. Also 
Showalter and Thurston (1997) find elasticities for self-employed US physicians equal to 0.33 
while the effect is small and insignificant for employed physicians. Their paper utilizes a 
labour supply model that is similar to the one of Baltagi et al (2005) and it is different from 
ours because they don’t take into account institutional constraints in terms of hours’ choices, 
choices among job types, and taste persistence over time.  Ikenwilo (2007) estimates a labour 
supply model where they include job satisfaction. They use data from a Scottish survey of 
physicians. The uncompensated earnings elasticities vary between 0.09 (without job’s quality 
controls) and 0.12 when they control for job’s quality. Elasticities are lower for physicians 
working full time and they find the usual gender difference in the elasticities.   
Our results imply that overall wage increases and tax reductions give the medical doctors 
an incentive to move to full time jobs, in particular in the private sector, at the expense of 
working in other jobs in the health care sector of economy. Because we allow other attributes 
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than pure economic incentives to matter in explaining behaviour, captured by random parts in 
the preference structure, and because availability of jobs and restrictions on hours work vary 
across jobs, the overall impact on labor supply among employed Norwegian medical doctors 
of changes in economic incentives is rather modest. Our estimates of labor supply elasticities 
are in line with the results for employed doctors reported in Showalter and Thurston (1997) 
and Ikenwilo (2007). It should be noted that the impact of a wage increase on labor supply is 
in part absorbed by taxation. Because all details of a step-wise linear progressive tax system is 
accounted for in our model, this absorption is explicitly accounted for.  
The paper is organised as follows.  In Section 2 the model is presented. Section 3 describes 
the data. Estimates are given in Section 4. Elasticities and the impact of changes in taxation 
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 The random utility labor supply model 
 
We will assume that physicians make a choice of where to work according to what 
maximizes his or her utility. In what follows, we will estimate this behavior on panel data and 
we thus need a model that accounts for transition between states. The model we employ 
allows for correlation in utilities across time. Our econometric model builds on the 
econometric framework developed in Dagsvik (2002). Let Ujn(t) be the utility of physician n 
when working in job type j at time t. The utility function is assumed to be random because 
there are job attributes that affect preferences that we do not observe. Let vjn(t) be the 
systematic part of the utility function and let ɛjn(t) be the random taste shifter, assumed to be 
independent and identical  extreme value distributed. Following Dagsvik (2002), we assume 
that 
  
(1) jn jn jn jnU (t) max U (t 1) ,v (t) (t)  = − −ρ +ε  
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The coefficient ρ is a preference discount factor. If ρ =0 there is a complete strong taste 
persistence, and if ρ =∞ there is no taste persistence at all and jn jn jnU (t) v (t) (t)= +ε . The 
inclusion of taste persistence is a behavioural assumption and it implies that individuals' past 
options (and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices. This implies that the 
current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, 
not only the optimal one.  
The expected value of Ujn(t) is given by 
(2) 
0
t
jn jn
r t
E U (t) ln exp(v (r) (t r) )
=
        
= − − ρ∑  
or 
(3) { }
0
jn
t
jn
r t
exp v (r) (t r)exp E U (t)
=
   − − ρ   = ∑  
 
To calculate correlation across utilities it is convenient to calculate correlation of a monotone 
transformation of the utilities: 
(4) { } { }{ }jnjn (t s)jn jn
E U (s)
E U (t)
exp
corr exp U (s) ,exp U (t) e ;   for s t
exp
− − ρ           
− − = ≤  
 
We observe that if covariates are constant over time the correlation from t to t-1 is 
approximately equal to e-ρ.   
 As shown in Dagsvik (2002) the model can be employed to yield transition 
probabilities, which here will be estimated on panel data. We will assume that doctor n will 
choose the state that maximizes utility, given his or her choice set. Physicians can choose 
between 10 states, which vary with respect to type of institution (hospitals versus primary 
care), sector (public versus private) and hours offered by the institutions in the health care 
sector (part time versus full time). Part time is defined as a number of hours of work less than 
30.  
We will assume that the choice set is the same for all physicians. The choice set is 
related to availability of jobs, characterized by offered hours. Thus, in our model the 
physicians are not free to choose any hours they like to work. Hours are regulated, in part by 
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the institutions and in part by the unions.  To this end, let the probability density of offered 
hours be given by 
 
jnt jnt j jnt jnt jnt(5) g (h ) exp(d z ); z 1if h 30; 0 otherwise= = ≥ =  
 
Note that the g(.) function captures the rationing of full time jobs and djt are parameters to 
be estimated for each sector j at each time t. They capture the availability of full time hours in 
the different jobs.6 In the estimation, the sum of dj has an upper bound which ensures that  
that 0≤dj<1 for all j.
 
 Let Qijnt denotes the probability that doctor n moves from  state i  in period t-1 to state j in 
period t, and Qiint denotes the probability that doctor n stays in state i also in period t. 
With the assumed probability distribution for εjnt , we get (Dagsvik (2002): 
 
(6)  0
jnt
ijnt t
r t
9
knr
k 0
9
iint ijnt
j 0
j i
V
Q ;   i, j 0,1,2,...,9
exp( (t r) ) V
Q 1 Q ;  i, j 0,1,2,...,9
= =
=≠
=      
∀ =
− − ρ
= − ∀ =
∑ ∑
∑
 
 
where Vjnt   is equal to: 
 
(7) 
jnt jnt nt, jnt
jnt nt, jnt jnt t jnt jnt nt nt jnt
t
t jnt jnt nt jnt jnt nt t jnt jnt nt
ntjnt jnt jnt
jnt
ntjnt jnt
 is given by:
,L   = v  (f (w h +SI )+I , L )
and f  is equal to: 
f (w h +SI )=w h +SI -T (w h +SI )
V (w ,h ,SI I )g (h )
and 
(w ,h ,SI I )
= ψ
ψ
ψ  
 
Ljnt is annual leisure. Let Cjnt be disposable annual income. Disposable income is given by 
 
                                                 
6 See Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) for further details about rationing of jobs in labor supply models. 
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(8) Cjnt= ft(wjnthjnt+SInt)+Int, 
 
Here wjnt is the hourly wage rate, hjnt denotes annual hours of work, SInt is the wage income 
from secondary jobs and Int is non-labor income, including the after-tax income of a spouse, 
child benefits and other benefits. The functional form of ft(.) depends on the characteristics of 
the tax function, Tt(.), which is a step-wise linear tax function at time t, see tables A1-A3 in 
Appendix A. 
 The different job types that the employed doctor can choose between are:  
0 = not working 
1 = working part time in a hospital in the private sector; 
2 = working full time in a hospital in the private sector; 
3 = working part time in primary care in the private sector; 
4 = working full time in primary care in the private sector; 
5 = working part time in a hospital in the public sector; 
6 = working full time in a hospital in the public sector;  
7 = working part time in primary care in the public sector; 
8 = working full time in primary care in the public sector; 
9= working in other sectors. 
 
The states, 1-9, give all possible type of jobs that employed physicians can choose 
between, and hence should be part of a labor supply model that attempts at studying labor 
supply among the stock of employed physicians. 
For instance, if we assume there are only 3 time periods, t=0,1,2, the probability of moving 
from sector 1 in period 0 to sector 2 in period 1 is equal to 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 2 1
12 1 1 9 9 9
0 1
0 0 0 0
(9)
exp 1 exp exp 2
n n
n
knr kn kn
r K K K
V VQ
r V V Vρ ρ ρ
= = = =
= =        − − − + −          ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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This model therefore implies that the probability of moving from one state to another is 
influenced only by the past and not by the future. The higherρ , the less important is the past; 
i.e. previous utility functions do not weight much. 
 
 
2.2 The deterministic part of the utility function 
 
We will assume that the systematic or deterministic part of the utility function is given by: 
 
55 8
jnt jnt 0
jnt s snt s snt
s 1 s 6
(C 10 ) 1 (L L ) 1
(10) log (A a X ) (B b X )
−
= =
λ γ− − −= + + +λ γψ ∑ ∑  
 
Here: 
X1nt= age; 
X2nt= age squared; 
X3nt= 1 if married to a person in the health sector, =0 otherwise; 
X4nt= 1 if more than one job, =0 otherwise; 
X5nt= 1 working in turnus7, =0 otherwise; 
X6nt= number of children ≤6; 
X7nt= number of children {>6,≤11}; 
X8nt=1 if female, =0 otherwise. 
 
jnt
jnt
8760 (12x365) 48h
(11) L
8760
− −=  
                                                 
7 It is mandatory for all physicians to work their final year of studying medicine as an apprentice doctor in a 
given, often rural, location.  
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where hjnt is hours per week. We have assumed 12 hours a day for rest and sleep and 48 weeks 
of work a year. Therefore, leisure in this definition is equal to the total number of hours in a 
year (8760) minus sleeping time in a year minus hours of work. Leisure includes therefore 
hours in the week-ends and in vacation time.  
 
nρ   may depend on the age and age squared of the doctor: 
  
nt 0 1 1nt 2 2nt(12) X Xρ = ρ +ρ +ρ  
 
We expect that the older the doctor is, the lower is ρnt. This means that we expect that 
older physicians have stronger taste persistence than younger physicians and hence they are 
more reluctant to move when economic incentives changes, than the young.   
Notice that the probability that an individual is observed in state j at time t, given that state 
i was left at time t-1, denoted qjnt, is given by 
 
ijnt jnt
jnt 16
iint
knt
k i
Q V
(13) q
1 Q V
≠
= =− ∑
 
And state probabilities, denoted Pjnt, are given by 
 
[ ]
0
0
t
n jnt
r t
jnt t 16
n knr
r t k 1
exp( (t r) )V
(14) P
exp( (t r) ) V
=
= =
− − ρ
=
− − ρ
∑
∑ ∑
 
 
2.3 The wage equations 
 
In order to estimate the model we need estimates of the wage equations. Log wage is assumed 
to depend on observed covariates (the Z-vector to be defined below) and a random term. The 
random term consist of two parts; one that is distributed across job types, individuals and time 
and one that is distributed only across individuals. The coefficients related to the latter random 
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component accounts for correlation in wages across type of jobs at each point in time. The 
wage equations are the following: 
 
int nt it int
int int it n
n
int it int int
log W Z
e
(15)
L(0,1)
e e , where e L(0,1)
= β +η
η = + κ τ
τ
= σ

∼
 ∼
 
 
L(0,1) is the standard logistic distribution 
 
We then get 
 
int nt it it int it n(16) log W Z e ;       i 1,2, , ,9= β +σ + κ τ =  
 
The correlations in wages across jobs are given by:  
int jnt int jnt it jt
it jt
int jnt 2 2 2 2
it it jt jt
cov( , ) E
(17)
corr( , )
 η η = η η = κ κ 
κ κη η = σ + κ σ + κ
 
 
The wage equations are estimated separately, but we account for selection in the following 
way. We estimate a set of coefficients for every year. Hence we are using 3 (1997-1999) 
cross-section datasets to estimate the coefficients. In the estimation of the wage equation we 
use a larger data set. Unmarried doctors are included and the justification is that there are no 
reason to expect wages to differ with respect to marital status. The coefficients vary across the 
9 job types and over time. The vector of the explanatory variables is: 
 
Znt=(1,age,gender, centrality index8, education) 
 
Let φ be the density for the normalized (0,1) logistic density distribution. And let 
                                                 
8 See table B2 for descriptive statistics of these variables. 
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t
9
jnt nt jt jt n jt jnt
t
j 1 jt jnt jt
sS
jnt nt jt jt n jt jnt
1 jt
N 9
t jt jnt
n 1 j 1
log w Z log P1L ( )
w
and
log w Z log P1ˆ(18) (.) ( )
S
and
ˆlogL log log w log (.)
=
= =
− β − κ τ −λ= ϕσ σ
− β − κ τ −λϕ = ϕ σ
= − σ − + ϕ
∏
∑
∑∑
 
 
The latter is used to estimate coefficients in the wage equations. Here s is a random draw 
for each individual from a standard logistic distribution, number of draws are S=20. Pjnt is a 
standard multinomial logit probability (for doctor n, working in job type j at time t) used to 
capture selection effects, see Strøm  and Wagenhals m (1991) for an outline of selection 
effects in wage equations with logistic distributed error terms.  
 
jnt
jnt 9
knt
k 0
jnt nt jt
v
P ; j 0,1, 2, , ,9
v(19)
v y
=
= =
= α
∑  
Here ynt=(1,age,education, number of children above and below 6 years of age, dummy for 
married or cohabiting, dummy for married to a person working in the health sector or not, 
spouse income).  
The estimated probability Pjnt is included in the wage density in equation (18) when the 
wage equations are estimated. 
Note that the coefficients, both in the wage equations and in the probabilities capturing 
selection effects vary across alternatives and over time. Not working is among the alternatives 
in the probabilities. 
The estimates of the wage equations and the probabilities related to selection effects, as 
well as summary statistics, are given in Appendix B.  
 
2.4 The estimation procedure 
 
 
12
  
 
To proceed with the estimation of the utility function we first have to calculate the 
disposable income function, here called consumption, in each of the 10 states. For all states, 
irrespective of the fact that we have observed the wage in the job chosen by the agent, we use 
the wage equation, including all terms, also the error terms. For the working states we have 
done the following:   
 
int t int jn t nst nt
t int int nst int in t nst int in t nst
int nt it it int i n
C = f (w h +I )+I ,      i=1,2,,9
(20) f (w h +I )=w h +I T(w h +I )
ˆˆlog W Z e ;       i 1,2, , ,9
−
= β +σ + κ τ =  
 
 
The consumption that we will use in the estimation of the utility function is: 
 
S R
s r
int t nt it it int i n in t nst
s=1 r=1
1(21) C = f exp(Z e )h +I ,       i=1,2,,,9
SR
 β + σ + κ τ ∑∑    
 
Here the coefficients in he wage equations are estimated from the previous step. s=1,2,,,S 
and r=1,2,,,R  are draws from the standard logistic distribution. We have used S=R=20. 
Instead of integrating the error terms in the wage equations in the disposable income function, 
we could have integrated them out in the final likelihood function. Due to the complexity of 
the model we have chosen to do the former. 
The utility function is estimated on the following transition probabilities: 
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[ ]ijnt
0
55 8
jnt jnt 0
s snt s snt jnt j
s 1 s 6
5t 9 5 8
k n r 0k n r
n s snt s snr k n r k
r t k 1 s 1 s 1
iint ij
(22) Q
(C 10 ) 1 (L L ) 1
exp[(A a X ) (B b X ) ]exp(z d )
(L L ) 1(C 10 ) 1
exp( (t r) exp (A a X ) (B b X ) exp(z d )
(23) Q 1 Q
− λ γ
= =
−
= = = =
γλ=
− − −+ + +λ γ
− −−− − ρ + + +λ γ
   
= −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
6
nt
j i
;
i, j 0,1,2, , ,9
≠
=
∑
 
 
The initial year, t0, is 1997, and the years where transitions can take place are 1998 and 
1999. We observe that exp(zjntdj) is multiplied with the exp of the deterministic part of the 
utility function. This weightings of the of the exp of the deterministic part of the utility 
function extends the traditional conditional logit choice probability and is due to the fact that 
jobs are rationed, for more details we refer to Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). 
Let the remaining coefficient to be estimated be t n j(A,a, , ,B,b, ,d )π = γ λ ρ  
Suppressing the observed variables, the transition probabilities can be written 
  
ijnt ijnt(24) Q Q ( )= π  
 
The likelihood for our sample is: 
 
tN1999 9 9
ijnt
t 1997 n 1 i 1 j 1
i( t 1),j( t ),ny
i(t 1), j(t),n
i(t 1), j(t),n
Q ( )
1 if n transit from state i in year t 1 to state j in year t
otherwise
(24) L
y
y 0
= = = =
−
−
−
π
= −
=
=
∏ ∏∏∏
 
 
The coefficients n j(A,a, , ,B,b, ,d )π = γ λ ρ are estimated by maximizing the likelihood 
function. Notice that for each individual there are only two probabilities present in the 
likelihood, namely those related to the transitions chosen.  
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3. Data  
 
The data used in this study are the result of merging register data from Statistics Norway with 
data on physicians collected by The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities 
(from the PAI9 register). The register data from Statistics Norway consists of demographic, 
educational, income and labor market data. The income data is taken from tax returns, while 
the labor market data consist of employee data merged with data on employers. 
The resulting panel data set covers all physicians in Norway in the period 1996 – 2000. 
We consider an individual as a doctor either if the person’s educational attainment is as a 
doctor or if the person works as a doctor. In this way we include persons who might have 
several educations or an education abroad (in which cases the registered educational 
attainment might not be as a doctor). Some individuals become physicians during the period 
1996 – 2000. In the year 2000 there were 12,376 physicians in Norway. We excluded the 
years 1996 and 2000 from our estimation because of problems with the capital income 
variables in 1996 (our income variables are taken from tax returns and therefore are vulnerable 
to changes in definitions of taxable income) and with the distribution over sectors in 2000 (the 
data for the last year seem to be preliminary). 
Observations of individuals with missing values for gender or job affiliation were 
dropped. To simplify our analysis we chose to estimate the model for those who were 
physicians throughout the period 1997 – 1999 and who did not change civil status during this 
period. Individuals who were not a doctor in this period were thereby dropped as were those 
who became married or divorced. Table 1 gives an overview of the relationship between our 
original data set and the data set for which we have estimated our model: 6,564 married 
physicians.  
 
TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
                                                 
9 The PAI register consists of data on workers in public enterprises, including physicians and nurses working in 
hospitals and health care. 
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We coded the data so that we ended up with 10 different sectors of work (including not 
working) divided according to whether a doctor worked in a hospital or in general health care, 
whether in a public or private institution and whether it was part-time and full time10. Our data 
only included hours worked per year, so weekly hours are calculated by dividing hours 
worked in a year by 48 (weeks in a year minus vacation). For physicians not working in a 
hospital or health care, we do not differentiate between part-time and full- time work. Doctors 
choose between the different sectors under the assumption that in each sector they will receive 
a wage generated by the wage equations and work the average observed hours in the sector. 
Table 2 shows the number of hours worked in the different sectors. Working hours are longer 
in the private sector compared to in the public sector.  
 
TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
Table 3 gives the distribution of married physicians by gender and across sectors. Women 
constitute around 27 per cent of doctors. Most doctors work in public hospital followed by the 
sector called other, and then followed by public health care.  
 
TABLE 3 AND 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Table 4 provides the age distribution of married doctors in the three years considered in the 
analysis.  
Our model is based on the assumption that we can simulate the different levels of 
consumption and leisure which could be achieved by each individual in each sector if they 
chose to work there. Our calculations are based on estimated wage equations done 
independently for the three years 1997, 1998 and 1999. These estimates are commented on in 
Appendix B. The resulting levels of possible consumption and leisure are reported in Table 5. 
For the states which are observed chosen by an individual we use observed leisure, while for 
                                                 
10 The part-time category includes physicians who work less than 30 hours a week. 
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other potential, but not chosen states, we use average leisure among those observed in the 
state. 
TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Consumption is determined by wage income, capital income, transfer income and the income 
of the spouse. All income variables were deflated by the consumer price index. Leisure is 
expressed as a percentage of available time. Available time includes time over the week-ends 
and vacation time but excludes 12 hours per day of sleeping and personal care time. Table 5 
shows that leisure is slightly increasing over time except for physicians working in private and 
public health care full time.  
Table 6 shows the mean of the variable, zjnt, (i.e the dummy for observed full time) indicating 
whether a doctor is observed working full time in a sector or not. The percentage of physicians 
working full time in the “other” sector has been falling, while it has been increasing in the 
“private hospital” and “private health care” sectors.   
TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Summary statistics for the remaining explanatory variables are given in Table 7. We use 
dummy variables for whether the spouse works in the health sector, whether the doctor has a 
side job in addition to the main job and whether the doctor is working “turnus”11.  
TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
4. Estimates.  
In table 8 we give the estimates of the utility function and of the density function for offered 
hours in full time jobs.  
 
TABLE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
                                                 
11 All physicians have to work their final university year as an apprentice doctor in a given, often rural, location. 
This year is called turnus. 
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 The estimates of λ and γ imply that the deterministic part of the utility function is 
strictly concave.  
Marginal utility of consumption is estimated to increase with age until till the age of 
4412. Thus younger physicians are estimated to be more willing work more than the older 
ones. With a spouse working in the health sector the incentives to go for higher working loads 
is strengthen. For physicians who are doing their internship (“turnus”) the impact is the 
opposite. 
Marginal utility of leisure is estimated to increase with the number of older children, 
which imply lesser incentives to go for high working loads. Young children has no impact and 
may be due to the fact that day care centers are available at the working place and/or that 
flexible working hours makes it easier to combine work and having small children. Gender has 
no impact on the marginal utility of leisure. This result could be related to the fact that our 
sample contains only highly educated individuals and also to the relatively egalitarian division 
of unpaid labor within the household in the Norwegian society. 
 The estimate of the discounting of utilities (the ρ-function) implies that it decreases 
with age up to the age of 5313. The decline with age means that the younger the doctor is the 
more he or she can be willing to move between jobs. After the age of 53, the estimated 
discounting indicate that physicians above this age again become more mobile (ρ becomes 
higher again), which may be due to the fact that older physicians leave the more strenuous full 
time job in hospitals and move to lower working loads or to jobs outside hospitals. The 
estimates of the density of offered hours imply that full time jobs are more available in public 
hospitals and public primary care relative to in the private sector. However, it should be kept 
in mind that a full time job in the private sector has more hours than in the public sector (see 
Table 2). 
  
                                                 
12 Our calculation based on the estimated coefficients. 
13 Our calculation based on the estimated coefficients; remember that ρ is a preference discount factor. If ρ =0 
there is a complete strong taste persistence, and if ρ =∞ there is no taste persistence at all. The inclusion of taste 
persistence is a behavioural assumption and it implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal 
choices) matter for current choices. This implies that the current choice depends on all the utility functions 
associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal one.  
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5. Labor supply elasticities and  the impact of less progressive taxes 
 on labor supply.  
Given the estimates of the model we can calculate uncompensated labor supply elasticites 
in two ways. We can either calculate the elasticity for each individual in the sample using the 
deterministic part of the utility function. Or we can use the whole model to calculate 
elasticities, with random preferences, densities of offered hours, random parts in wage 
equations, correlation of wages across job types and the step-wise linear tax function 
according to tax rules. The latter elasticities, denoted aggregate elasticities, means that we 
have to account for the possibility that physicians working in some state increases at the 
expense of a reduction in other states. Thus, we should expect that these aggregate elasticities 
are lower than the individual, job-specific labor supply elasticities. We would also argue that it 
is these aggregate elasticities that are of interest for the health authorities. The reason is that 
they account for the impact of wage increases, or tax rate changes, on the total hours supplied 
by all employed physicians in the population. 
If we use only the deterministic part of the utility function, we find that the individual job-
specific labor supply elasticities for physicians working in public and private hospitals, 
calculated at mean values, in 1999, are around 0.5. These individual job specific elasticities 
are comparable with the ones reported in Baltagi et al (2005), although ours are somewhat 
higher (0.5) than theirs (0.3).  
To find the aggregate labor supply elasticities we have calculated the impact of an overall 
increase in wages in 1997, 1998 and 1999 on total labor supply for employed physicians. 
Wages are increased in all 10 states. In calculating these elasticities, we have employed the 
whole model including the random terms in the utility function and the wage equations.  
 An important aspect of our model is that an overall wage increase, or job-specific wage 
increase, may move the physicians between the different job types. Given that he or she works 
in a hospital, an increase in labor supply may imply a move from part-time jobs to full time 
jobs. Or he or she can move to jobs with higher working loads outside hospitals. The reason 
why we do not let physicians work a little more, given the job, when economic incentives are 
improved, is due to the working loads offered by the management in hospital and primary 
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care. There are thus institutional constraints on hours worked that we have to consider when 
calculating the responses to economic incentives. 
 
Table 9 reports the impact of changes in wages and taxes on the mobility of physicians. In 
column 1, we report how the mobility of physicians between states in 1999 is affected by a 1 
per cent increase in wages in 1997, 1998 and 1999. These numbers can be interpreted as 
aggregate labor supply elasticities.  
 
TABLE 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
We find that an overall wage increase move physicians’ labor supply away from the public 
sector to the private sector, in particular to private hospitals working full time. The weighted 
overall aggregate labor supply elasticity, with total hours in the ten states as weights14, is 
rather modest, 0.04. The overall wage increase also reduces the probability of not working. 
The elasticity of not working with respect to an overall wage increase is about -0.3.  
The overall weighted elasticity of only 0.04 shadows for higher elasticity in specific jobs. 
A one per cent wage increase in the period 1997-1999 increases the number of physicians in 
full time jobs in private hospitals by 0.26 percent (table 9 col.1). This elasticity is not directly 
comparable with the job-specific elasticity reported above (around 0.5). There are two reasons 
for this. In the first place, the 0.26 elasticity is derived from a model where the random parts 
of the utility functions and wage equations are accounted for when the elasticity is calculated. 
These random parts of the utility function capture other attributes than the pure economic 
incentives related to working in different types of jobs in the health sector. If these random 
parts of preferences are ignored, after the model is estimated, one puts too much weight on 
economic incentives in explaining behaviour. Second, it is embedded in a framework where 
the physicians are allowed to move between different types of jobs. An overall wage increase 
may move the physicians that work the shortest hours (part time) towards job types with 
higher working loads (full time). If one fails to take into account that a wage increase shifts 
physicians around, one risk to overestimate the labor supply elasticities among physicians.  
  
                                                 
14 See section 2.1, and in particular equation (5). 
 
 
20
If only wages in the public and private hospitals are increased, the move towards jobs, in 
particular to private hospitals is increased at the expense of working in jobs outside hospitals 
and working in primary care (col. 4 in table 9). The number of physicians working full time 
and part time in the private sector increases by respectively 0.41 percent and 0.22 percent. The 
equivalent increases in the public hospitals are more modest, 0.06 and 0.15, respectively. 
Because there are far more physicians working in the public sector the weighted average 
elasticities over the four possible states in private and public hospitals (full time and part time) 
in 1999 is 0.08, while the weighted aggregate elasticity for the whole stock of physicians is 
0.03, which is due to the fact that physicians move from jobs outside hospitals to jobs in 
hospitals. The job type that has the strongest reduction is part time jobs in private primary 
care, -0.18 percent. The wage increase also increases the number of employed physicians (not 
working goes down by -0.16 percent). 
We have also calculated the impact on the transition between states of replacing the 
current progressive tax structure in the relevant years (1997, 1998 and 1999) by a flat tax of 
0.28 (see table 9 col. 2), which is a considerable change in marginal tax rates15. This tax 
change move physicians away from part time jobs towards full time jobs in both public and 
private sector, but the transition to private hospitals is by far the strongest. The number of 
physicians working in private hospitals increases by as much as 11.43 percent, mostly at the 
expense of physicians working part time jobs in hospitals and primary care. The impact on 
total hours in the population of medical doctors is rather modest; an increase of only 0.76 
percent.  
In 2006 the Norwegian tax structure was reformed with a rather strong cut in top marginal 
taxes16. When the tax function in 1999 is replaced by the tax function for 2006, we find results 
similar to the ones we found with a flat tax of 28% (see table 9 col. 3). The responses, 
however, are weaker. Medical doctors get an incentive to move to private hospital (an increase 
of 4.74% in full time jobs). The overall impact on supplied hours among employed physicians 
is only 0.43%.  
 
                                                 
15 See Appendix A for the complete tax structure in 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
16 The highest marginal rate in 2006 is equal to 44,8%, while in 1999 it is equal to 49,3%. Note that to be taxed at 
the highest tax rate in 2006 (44.8 %) the income in real terms has to be considerably higher than the income taxed 
on the margin by 49.8 % in 1999. The reform in 2006 thus implied a considerable swing away from progressive 
taxation. See tables A.3 and A.4 in appendix A. 
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In table 10 we report how consumption changes according to the different simulations 
reported above. From table 10 column 1, we observe that a one per cent wage increase implies 
a change in consumption ranging from 0.3 to 0.5 per cent in 1999.The highest change in 
consumption occurs for individuals working full time in private hospitals (0.51 percent). The 
introduction of a 28% flat tax (table 10 col. 2 ) raises consumption for physicians  working full 
time. The reason for reduction in consumption for doctors working part time is that their 
average tax in the observed tax regimes is less than 28%. 
 
TABLE 10 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
From Table 10 column 3, we observe that the less progressive tax structure of 2006 
increases disposable income among medical doctors by 6-8%. Physicians working full time in 
private hospitals get the highest increase.  
6. Conclusion  
We have estimated a structural labor supply model that allows for choices between types 
of jobs. At each point in time, physicians can choose between 10 different states which are a 
combination of working full time or part time, working in hospitals or primary care, working 
in the public or private sector and not working. In our model, the current choice depends on all 
the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal ones. 
Thus, we allow for the random parts of the utility functions to be correlated across time and 
types of jobs (taste persistence). This behavioural assumption implies that individuals' past 
options (and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices.  The model is estimated 
on a panel of 6,564 married Norwegian physicians from 1997 to 1999.  
Our study implies that overall wage increases and tax reductions give the medical doctors 
an incentive to move to full time jobs, in particular in the private sector, at the expense of 
working in other jobs in the health care sector of the economy. Because we allow other 
attributes than pure economic incentives to matter in explaining behaviour, captured by 
random parts in the preference structure, and because availability of jobs and restrictions on 
hours work vary across jobs, the overall impact on labor supply among Norwegian medical 
doctors of changes in economic incentives is rather modest.  
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Table 1. Sample selection 
      
Norwegians who were physicians in 2000, original data set   12,376 
Dropped due to missing sector or missing gender     688 
Dropped if not a doctor in 1997, 1998 or 1999     2,172 
  
Dropped if  a change of civil status occurred 1997 - 1999  1,175 
Dropped if occupation not relevant   18 
      
Total retained    8,323 
      
Married and a doctor throughout 1997 - 1999:  6,564 
Unmarried and a doctor throughout 1997 - 1999: 1,759 
      
Sum     8,323 
 
 
Table 2. Average weekly hours across sectors. 
     
 1997 1998 1999  
     
  1. Public hospital, part-time 20.0 19.1 18.7  
  2.     “      “             full time 40.0 39.9 39.3  
  3. Private hospital, part-time 19.1 20.2 18.5  
  4.     “      “             full time 42.2 41.9 42.1  
  5. Public health care, part-time 16.7 15.7 15.6  
  6.     “      “             full time 40.5 40.6 40.6  
  7. Private health care, part-time 14.6 13.2 13.9  
  8.     “      “             full time 42.3 42.6 42.8  
  9.other 29.3 26.7 26.2  
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Table 3. Distribution of married physicians by gender and across sectors. 
      
 1997  1998  1999 
 Male female  male female  male Female 
         
Physicians married throughout 1997 - 1999 4,765 1,799  4,765 1,799  4,765 1,799 
         
Per cent working in sector:         
  0. Not working 4.6 6.5  5.3 6.9  5.9 6.3 
  1. Public hospital, part-time 11.5 17.1  10.1 17.2  11.6 17.2 
  2.     “      “             full time 44.2 35.7  45.6 36.4  44.7 36.6 
  3. Private hospital, part-time 0.4 1.0  0.5 0.6  0.5 0.8 
  4.      “      “            full time 1.2 1.2  1.4 1.2  1.4 1.4 
  5. Public health care, part-time 11.3 13.7  11.6 15.5  12.9 16.6 
  6.       “      “               full time 6.0 6.4  5.4 5.6  4.6 5.4 
  7. Private health care, part-time 2.0 1.3  2.2 1.6  2.2 1.6 
  8.      “         “        “    full time 1.6 1.2  1.9 1.1  2.2 0.9 
  9. Other 17.2 16.0  16.0 14.1  14.1 13.1 
Total 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
 
Table 4. Age distribution of married physicians 
 Married  
 1997 1998 1999  
    <20     
20-24     
25-29 221 120 48  
30-34 698 620 547  
35-39 1,084 1,023 953  
40-44 1,340 1,287 1,248  
45-49 1,169 1,257 1,280  
50-54 973 1,021 1,041  
55-59 568 627 732  
60-64 378 403 449  
65+ 133 206 266  
     
Sum 6,564 6,564 6,564  
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Table 5. Mean consumption and leisure for married physicians by sector. Norwegian 
kroner and per cent. 
     
  
Mean consumption 
(NOK)  
Mean leisure 
(as % of available time) 
  1997 1998 1999  1997 1998 1999 
         
  0. Not working  234,008 208,758 230,922  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  1. Public hospital, part-time  376,104 347,365 366,002  78.1% 79.1% 79.4% 
  2.       “        “         full time  457,517 444,162 467,571  56.2% 56.2% 56.9% 
  3. Private hospital, part-time  375,572 370,105 370,429  79.1% 77.9% 79.8% 
  4.      “            “       full time  514,895 497,835 556,823  53.7% 54.1% 53.9% 
  5. Public health care, part-time  334,460 308,563 332,590  81.7% 82.9% 82.9% 
  6.      “         “        “   full time  448,288 439,211 467,161  55.6% 55.5% 55.5% 
  7. Private health care, part-time  325,550 304,015 330,991  84.0% 85.6% 84.7% 
  8.      “          “        “   full time  446,135 446,595 497,167  53.7% 53.3% 53.1% 
  9. Other  399,800 368,367 394,853  68.0% 70.7% 71.3% 
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Table 6. Mean of dummy for observed full time, zjnt, by sector. 
          
   Married   
   1997 1998 1999     
          
  1. Public hospital, full time 0.419 0.431 0.424     
  3. Private hospital, full time 0.012 0.013 0.014     
  5. Public health care, full time 0.061 0.054 0.048     
  7. Private health care, full time 0.015 0.017 0.018     
  9. Other   0.094 0.073 0.063     
          
  Full time in total  0.601 0.588 0.569     
Table 7. Mean of the explanatory variables. 
  Married   
  1997 1998 1999     
         
  Female  0.27 0.27 0.27     
  Age  45 46 47     
  Age squared  2108 2199 2292     
  No. children younger than 7 years  0.68 0.58 0.49     
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age  1.01 1.03 1.04     
  Spouse working in health sector  0.43 0.43 0.43     
  Has a side job  0.10 0.09 0.08     
  Works "turnus" (internship)  0.03 0.01 0.00     
         
  Number observations  6564 6564 6564     
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Table 8. Estimates of the utility function and offered hours density.  
Variables 
 (1) 
Coefficients 
(2) 
Estimates 
(3) 
Std. Err. 
 (4) 
 
Consumption:     
Constant A -2.28 0.8230 *** 
Age a1 0.14 0.0355 *** 
Age squared a2 -0.0016 0.000367 *** 
Married to a person in the health sector a3 0.15 0.0541 *** 
More than one job a4 0.22 0.0526 *** 
Working  during last year of university a5 -0.71 0.1933 *** 
Exponent λ 0.31 0.0651 *** 
Leisure:     
Constant B 5.07 0.3906 *** 
Number of children ≤6 b1 0.09 0.0960  
Number of children {>6,≤18} b2 0.24 0.0729 *** 
Female b3 0.10 0.1626  
Exponent γ 0.42 0.1799 ** 
Taste correlation:     
Constant ρ 0 13.76 1.4822 *** 
Age ρ 1 -0.49 0.0593 *** 
Age squared ρ 3 0.0046 0.0006 *** 
Density, offered hours, full time:     
Public hospitals  d2 0.25 0.0024 *** 
Private hospitals d4 0.13 0.0078 *** 
Public prim.care d6 0.21 0.0038 *** 
Private prim.care d8 0.17 0.0060 *** 
No of observations  6564   
Log likelihood  -10993   
McFaddens rho  0.27   
*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence level 
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Table 9. The impact of changes in wages and taxes on the mobility of physicians in 1997-
1999. 6564 married physicians. Percentage change in number of physicians and hours. 
 
 
Job types 
(1) 
1% wage increase 
in 1997, 1998 
and 1999 
(2) 
28% flat tax 
in 1997, 1998 
and 1999 
(3) 
2006 tax 
schedule used 
in 1999 
(4) 
1% wage increase 
hospital doctors 
in 1997, 1998 
and 1999 
Number physicians     
0. Not working -0.30 -1.53 -4.19 -0.16 
1. Public hospitals, part time 0.02 -1.73 0.16 0.15 
2. Public hospitals, full time 0.03 0.79 0.09 0.06 
3. Private hospitals, part time 0.04 -2.84 2.37 0.22 
4. Private hospitals, full time 0.26 11.43 4.74 0.41 
5. Public primary care, part time -0.03 -2.17 -0.54 -0.13 
6. Public primary care, full time 0.06 1.98 0.91 -0.08 
7. Private primary care, part time -0.03 -3.49 1.6 -0.18 
8. Private primary care, full time 0.14 5.05 2.73 -0.13 
9. Other 0.04 -0.54 -0.33 -0.08 
  Weighted average of total hours 0.04 0.76 0.43 0.03 
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Table  10. Per cent change in consumption when wages increase by 1 % or a 28 % flat 
tax is introduced and when 1999  tax schedule is replaced by 2006 tax schedule. 6564 
married physicians. 
 (1) 
1% wage increase 
in 1997, 1998 and 1999 
 (2) 
28% flat tax 
in 1997, 1998 and 1999 
(3) 
2006 tax 
schedule used 
in 1999 
 
Job types 1997 1998 1999  1997 1998 1999   
0. Not working 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
1. Public hospitals, part time 0.35 0.39 0.37  0.41 -0.22 -0.88 6.27  
2. Public hospitals, full time 0.40 0.44 0.42  6.28 6.56 5.02 7.25  
3. Private hospitals, part time 0.35 0.41 0.38  0.67 1.20 -0.72 6.23  
4. Private hospitals, full time 0.46 0.50 0.51  10.45 10.57 11.15 8.26  
5. Public primary care, part time 0.30 0.34 0.33  -1.04 -1.45 -1.73 6.46  
6. Public primary care, full time 0.39 0.43 0.42  5.52 6.14 5.00 7.25  
7. Private primary care, part time 0.28 0.33 0.33  -1.24 -1.55 -1.76 6.47  
8. Private primary care, full time 0.39 0.44 0.45  5.35 6.70 7.23 7.71  
9. Other 0.36 0.42 0.41  1.53 0.64 0.20 5.94  
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Appendix A. Tax functions. 
In this appendix, we only show tax functions for married when the spouse has an income. The 
tax function for married with a spouse without income is slightly different. In the empirical 
application we utilize all the appropriate tax functions. 
Table A.1 Tax function, 1997.  
Nominal income (NOK) Y Tax T (NOK) 
0-18 198 0 
18 198 - 24 709 0.25Y-4 250 
24 709 – 30 125  0.078Y 
30 125 – 156 500 0.302Y- 6 748 
156 500 – 233 000 0.358Y- 15 512 
233 000- 262 500 0.453Y – 37 647 
262 500- 0.495Y – 48 672 
Table A.2 Tax function, 1998.  
Nominal income (NOK) Y Tax T (NOK) 
0-18 198 0 
18 198 - 24 709 0.25Y-4 250 
24 709 – 31 250  0.078Y 
31 250– 163 000 0.302Y- 7 000 
163 000 – 248 000 0.358Y- 16 128 
248 000- 272 000 0.453Y – 39 688 
272 000- 0.495Y – 51 112 
Table A.3 Tax function, 1999.  
Nominal income (NOK) Y Tax T (NOK) 
0-21 800 0 
21 800 - 31 105 0.25Y-5 350 
31 105 – 33 291  0.078Y 
33 291 – 166 190 0.2992Y- 7 364 
166 190– 269 100 0.358Y- 17 136 
269 100- 0.493Y – 53 465 
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Table A.4 Tax function, 2006.  
Nominal income (NOK) Y Tax T (NOK) 
0-29 600 0 
29 600 - 43 023 0.25Y-7 400 
43 023– 67 200  0.078Y 
67 200 – 93 529 0.358Y- 18 816 
93 529– 179 706 0.2628Y- 9 912 
179 706- 394 000 0.358Y – 27 020 
394 000 – 750 000 0.448Y-62 480 
750 000- 0.478Y- 84 980 
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Appendix B. Wage equations and selection effects. 
 
As mentioned earlier, estimation of our model requires data for consumption in all possible 
states (nine working states). To be able to compute such counterfactual incomes we estimated 
wage equations for all individuals for the three years 1997, 1998 and 1999. It is usual in such 
estimations to take into account sample selection problems (the Heckman procedure is the 
most common procedure). We take sample selection into account by including the predicted 
choice probabilities, Pr1 – Pr9, as explanatory variables in the wage equations. These 
probabilities were the predictions resulting from a simple multinomial logit estimation of 
sector choice. We show the mean of the explanatory variables used for estimating the logit and 
the wage equations in Tables B.1 and B.2. The estimates are given in Table B.3 and the 
resulting average predicted probabilities are given in Tables B.4.  
Table B.1. Mean of the explanatory variables for the logit estimation. 
  1997 1998 1999
  Female  0.32 0.32 0.33
  Birthyear  1943 1943 1944
  Married  0.76 0.71 0.69
  No. children younger than 7 years  0.64 0.56 0.48
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age  0.80 0.78 0.76
  Less than 20 years of education  0.73 0.73 0.71
  20 or more years of education  0.08 0.08 0.09
  Missing education  0.09 0.09 0.10
  Spouse working in health sector  0.33 0.32 0.32
  Income of spouse, NOK  151,423   83,766   86,592
     
  Number observations  9,516 10,206 11,114
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Table B.2. Mean of the explanatory variables for the wage equations. 
  1997 1998 1999 
  Female  0.31 0.32 0.33 
  Birthyear  1943 1943 1943 
  Less than 20 years of education  0.74 0.73 0.71 
  20 or more years of education  0.08 0.09 0.10 
  Missing education  0.08 0.08 0.09 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner)  0.09 0.08 0.08 
  Less central and central municipalities  0.32 0.32 0.32 
  Especially central municipalities  0.59 0.60 0.60 
     
  Probability of working at job type 1  0.14 0.14 0.16 
  Probability of working at job type 2  0.39 0.40 0.38 
  Probability of working at job type 3  0.002 0.004 0.006 
  Probability of working at job type 4  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Probability of working at job type 5  0.09 0.11 0.12 
  Probability of working at job type 6  0.05 0.05 0.04 
  Probability of working at job type 7  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Probability of working at job type 8  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Probability of working at job type 9  0.16 0.15 0.13 
     
  Number observations  8,965 9,547 10,349 
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 Table B.3. Part 1. Logit estimates of choice of sector and hours (job type). Physicians 1997 – 1999. 
  1997   1998   1999 
 Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
1. Public hospital, part time            
  Female -0.06  0.1166  0.03  0.1027  0.09  0.0953 
  Age -0.09 *** 0.0063  -0.08 *** 0.0057  -0.09 *** 0.0050 
  Married 0.50 *** 0.1741  -0.05  0.1371  0.19  0.1249 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.21 *** -3.3500  -0.08 ** -1.2400  -0.22 *** -3.5300 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age -0.22 *** -3.7600  -0.16 *** -3.1000  -0.08 ** -1.5100 
  20 or more years of education 1.66 *** 5.3200  1.24 *** 5.2600  1.19 *** 5.4200 
  Missing education -0.54 *** -3.6200  -0.74 *** -5.3900  -0.67 *** -5.6800 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.51 *** 3.7900  0.43 *** 3.6700  0.53 *** 4.7800 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -1.49 *** 0.5640  -0.31  0.5550  0.25  0.4690 
  Constant 167.03 *** 12.2757  151.11 *** 11.1482  173.53 *** 9.7735 
2. Public hospital, fulltime            
  Female -0.16  0.1079  -0.22 ** 0.0945  -0.08  0.0897 
  Age -0.03 *** 0.0055  -0.02 *** 0.0050  -0.03 *** 0.0044 
  Married 0.60 *** 0.1578  0.08  0.1234  0.29 *** 0.1137 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.24 *** -4.0900  -0.04 ** -0.7400  -0.13 ** -2.2800 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age -0.13 *** -2.6000  -0.02 ** -0.3800  0.07 ** 1.6000 
  20 or more years of education 1.68 *** 5.6200  1.17 *** 5.3000  1.34 *** 6.4800 
  Missing education -0.85 *** -6.2300  -0.83 *** -6.7400  -0.96 *** -8.8400 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.85 *** 6.9600  0.62 *** 6.0100  0.72 *** 7.1400 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -1.58 *** 0.5000  -0.44  0.4840  -0.20  0.4180 
  Constant 55.81 *** 10.6583  37.05 *** 9.6725  52.79 *** 8.6016 
3. Private hospital, part time            
  Female 0.45  0.3153  -0.03  0.3075  0.43 * 0.2563 
  Age -0.07 *** 0.0192  -0.08 *** 0.0197  -0.06 *** 0.0149 
  Married 0.80  0.5007  0.07  0.4255  0.48  0.3558 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.24 ** -1.4000  -0.17 ** -0.9000  0.01 ** 0.0700 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age -0.12 ** -0.7400  0.06 ** 0.3800  -0.11 ** -0.7700 
  20 or more years of education -12.36 ** -0.0300  0.37 ** 0.4900  1.28 *** 2.8200 
  Missing education -0.51 ** -1.1200  -0.50 ** -1.1000  -0.71 ** -1.8200 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.62 ** 1.7800  0.20 ** 0.5900  0.48 ** 1.6800 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -0.89  1.5100  2.68 ** 1.1500  0.81  1.1500 
  Constant 131.95 *** 37.3303  151.03 *** 38.2027  112.53 *** 28.8768 
4. Private hospital, fulltime            
  Female -0.04  0.2480  0.16  0.2062  0.21  0.2000 
  Age -0.03 ** 0.0134  -0.03 ** 0.0118  -0.03 *** 0.0110 
  Married 0.54  0.3737  0.29  0.2782  0.19  0.2464 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.15 ** -1.1400  0.05 ** 0.3800  0.00 ** 0.0200 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age -0.19 ** -1.5900  0.04 ** 0.3700  0.16 ** 1.6900 
  20 or more years of education 1.34 *** 2.9000  0.68 ** 1.6600  0.38 ** 0.8700 
  Missing education -1.21 *** -2.7200  -0.91 *** -2.5900  -1.10 *** -3.3300 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.48 ** 1.8400  0.54  2.5000  0.69 *** 3.2500 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -1.15  1.1500  -2.03 * 1.1800  -0.53  0.5490 
  Constant 60.10 ** 25.9985  46.90 ** 22.9587  62.32 *** 21.4418 
5. Public health care, part time            
  Female 0.00  0.1235  -0.04  0.1078  0.02  0.1013 
  Age -0.05 *** 0.0067  -0.03 *** 0.0060  -0.04 *** 0.0053 
  Married 1.05 *** 0.1852  0.27 * 0.1436  0.51 *** 0.1307 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.17 ** -2.4900  0.00 ** -0.0400  -0.10 ** -1.4800 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age 0.16 *** 2.9400  0.22 *** 4.4500  0.25 *** 5.2400 
  20 or more years of education -1.38 *** -2.7200  -0.93 *** -2.8600  -0.20 ** -0.7600 
  Missing education -0.74 *** -4.4200  -0.84 *** -5.5200  -0.97 *** -7.1900 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.55 *** 4.0600  0.34 *** 2.9200  0.43 *** 3.7800 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -2.33 *** 0.5740  -0.82  0.5630  -0.19  0.4530 
  Constant 101.50 *** 13.0719  65.04 *** 11.5900  83.52 *** 10.2241 
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Table B.3. Part 2 Logit estimates of choice of sector and hours (job type). Physicians 1997 – 1999. 
         
  1997   1998   1999 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err..  Coef.  Std. Err. 
6. Public health care, fulltime            
  Female 0.10  0.1433  0.00  0.1322  0.12  0.1262 
  Age -0.02 *** 0.0075  0.00  0.0071  -0.02 ** 0.0064 
  Married 1.01 *** 0.2114  0.17  0.1757  -0.03  0.1630 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.21 *** -2.6800  0.01 ** 0.1700  -0.14 ** -1.6500 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age 0.03 ** 0.5300  0.02 ** 0.3400  0.18 *** 2.9400 
  20 or more years of education -1.19 ** -2.0500  -0.60 ** -1.6200  0.07 ** 0.2400 
  Missing education -0.58 *** -3.0200  -0.69 *** -3.6100  -1.01 *** -5.5800 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.62 *** 4.0400  0.39 *** 2.8100  0.46 *** 3.3000 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -2.94 *** 0.6570  0.03  0.6560  0.08  0.5970 
  Constant 41.04 *** 14.6134  7.47  13.7965  31.08 ** 12.5408 
7. Private health care, part time            
  Female -0.29  0.2443  -0.33  0.2058  -0.37 * 0.2002 
  Age -0.04 *** 0.0138  -0.03 *** 0.0115  -0.04 *** 0.0104 
  Married 1.36 *** 0.4068  0.72 ** 0.2955  0.55 ** 0.2644 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.19 ** -1.4500  -0.26 ** -1.9500  -0.21 ** -1.6400 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age 0.19 ** 2.1000  0.20 ** 2.4400  0.24 *** 2.9600 
  20 or more years of education -1.26 ** -1.2000  -0.32 ** -0.6300  -0.08 ** -0.1700 
  Missing education -0.50 ** -1.4700  -0.62 ** -1.9800  -0.59 ** -2.2300 
  Spouse working in health sector 1.26 *** 5.6700  1.02 *** 5.3600  1.18 *** 6.3600 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -2.10 ** 1.0300  -0.22  0.9020  0.30  0.8130 
  Constant 82.04 *** 26.8294  55.79 ** 22.3203  77.97 *** 20.2092 
8. Private health care, fulltime            
  Female -0.33  0.2472  -0.50 ** 0.2235  -0.59 *** 0.2293 
  Age -0.04 *** 0.0134  -0.02 ** 0.0117  -0.02 * 0.0110 
  Married 0.75 * 0.3862  0.29  0.2855  0.54 ** 0.2720 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.33 ** -2.4200  -0.13 ** -1.0000  -0.06 ** -0.4600 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age 0.03 ** 0.3000  0.13 ** 1.5000  0.24 *** 2.8900 
  20 or more years of education 0.17 ** 0.2800  -0.02 ** -0.0400  0.22 ** 0.5200 
  Missing education -1.25 *** -2.8200  -0.77 ** -2.2700  -1.35 *** -3.5500 
  Spouse working in health sector 1.31 *** 5.6700  1.13 *** 5.6100  1.11 *** 5.7300 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -1.58  1.0700  -0.86  1.0100  -0.25  0.6330 
  Constant 82.63 *** 26.0195  44.11 * 22.6927  38.59 * 21.4841 
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime          
  Female -0.19  0.1168  -0.23 ** 0.1049  -0.07  0.1012 
  Age -0.02 *** 0.0060  -0.02 *** 0.0056  -0.04 *** 0.0051 
  Married 0.56 *** 0.1705  0.10  0.1370  0.30 ** 0.1300 
  No. children younger than 7 years -0.21 *** -3.3000  -0.07 ** -1.1100  -0.23 *** -3.4200 
  No. children 7  to 18 years of age 0.06 ** 1.1800  0.12 ** 2.5300  0.17 *** 3.5500 
  20 or more years of education 1.37 *** 4.4300  1.28 *** 5.5900  1.50 *** 6.9300 
  Missing education -0.54 *** -3.6200  -0.64 *** -4.5400  -0.94 *** -6.9900 
  Spouse working in health sector 0.10 ** 0.7900  0.12 ** 1.0100  0.28 * 2.4400 
  Income of spouse (1/1,000,000) -0.90 * 0.5340  -0.16  0.5340  0.10  0.4750 
  Constant 48.13 *** 11.6302  47.87 *** 10.8567  76.82 *** 9.9579 
            
Number observations   9516    10206    11114 
Log liklihood   -15800.67    -17092.76    -18748.45 
LR chi2(81)   1379.73    1271.35    1545.97 
Pseudo R2   0.04    0.04    0.04 
            
*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval ** statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval 
* statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval 
The base outcome is not working.  The base category is male, unmarried physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and no 
children under 19 years of age (and, since they are unmarried, no spouse working in the health sector).   
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Table B.4. Average predicted probabilities, Pr1 – Pr9, of choosing different job types. All physicians in 
1997, 1998 and 1999. 
            
  1997    1998    1999  
 Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
            
Pr1: Public hospital, part time 0.157 0.023 0.428  0.160 0.016 0.491  0.186 0.006 0.480 
Pr2: Public hospital, fulltime 0.403 0.182 0.780  0.407 0.240 0.699  0.387 0.201 0.700 
Pr3: Private hospital, part time 0.006 0.000 0.020  0.005 0.000 0.078  0.007 0.000 0.039 
Pr4: Private hospital, fulltime 0.011 0.002 0.018  0.013 0.002 0.033  0.013 0.004 0.159 
Pr5: Public health care, part time 0.113 0.003 0.317  0.119 0.010 0.337  0.127 0.022 0.294 
Pr6: Public health care, fulltime 0.057 0.002 0.435  0.050 0.005 0.115  0.047 0.009 0.103 
Pr7: Private health care, part time 0.015 0.000 0.067  0.017 0.001 0.062  0.016 0.002 0.065 
Pr8: Private health care, fulltime 0.014 0.002 0.035  0.015 0.002 0.046  0.014 0.001 0.062 
Pr9: Other sectors, both part time and fulltime 0.166 0.035 0.377  0.152 0.081 0.369  0.134 0.023 0.301 
            
Residual, not working 0.058    0.064    0.069   
            
Table B.5. gives details on the observations used in the logit estimations and in estimating the 
wage equations. The logit estimations were done on all physicians in a given year, while the 
wage equations were estimated on all working physicians with observations of wage income.  
Table B.5. Sample selection for logit estimation and estimation of wage eqations. 
 1997 1998 1999 
Physicians, used in logit estimation 9,516 10,206 11,114 
    
Not working -550 -656 -763 
Missing wage income -1 -3 -2 
Working physicians, used in wage eq. 8,965 9,547 10,349 
The estimates of the wage equations are given in Table B.6. The wage equations for all nine 
work sectors have been estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood, allowing for 
correlation between the different wages. The parameters σ1 to σ9 are the variance parameters 
mentioned in the main paper, and the parameters κ1 to κ9 are the parameters allowing for 
correlation between sectors. As can be seen from Table B.6, only κ4 in 1997 is found 
significant at level of 95% or better, indicating that there is not much residual correlation 
between the different wages after correcting for the other explanatory variables. 
As expected, one finds the most significant results in the largest sector, full time work in a 
public hospital. In this sector, being a woman reduces wages, while wages increase with age.  
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Table B.6. Part 1. Estimated coefficients of the wage equations for physicians 1997 – 1999.  
         
  1997   1998   1999 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
1. Public hospital part time            
  Female -0.03  0.0187  0.04 ** 0.0169  0.00  0.0114 
  Age 0.00  0.0030  0.00  0.0024  0.00 *** 0.0018 
  20 or more years of education 0.13 *** 0.0416  0.16 *** 0.0330  0.06 *** 0.0204 
  Missing education 0.01  0.0295  0.01  0.0248  0.09 *** 0.0179 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner) -0.08 *** 0.0308  -0.08 *** 0.0280  -0.05 ** 0.0215 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.03  0.0194  -0.03 ** 0.0164  0.01  0.0114 
  Pr1 -0.16 *** 0.0518  -0.16 *** 0.0413  -0.14 *** 0.0336 
  Constant -2.68  5.6776  -1.22  4.4944  -4.40  3.5292 
  σ1 0.20 *** 0.0045  0.18 *** 0.0040  0.15 *** 0.0029 
2. Public hospital fulltime            
  Female -0.03 *** 0.0067  -0.02 *** 0.0067  0.00  0.0046 
  Age 0.01 *** 0.0004  0.01 *** 0.0004  0.00 *** 0.0003 
  20 or more years of education 0.07 *** 0.0123  0.02 ** 0.0113  -0.03 *** 0.0078 
  Missing education -0.06 *** 0.0110  -0.02 ** 0.0102  0.02 *** 0.0081 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner) -0.05 *** 0.0151  -0.07 *** 0.0142  -0.01  0.0119 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.05 *** 0.0059  -0.04 *** 0.0054  -0.02 *** 0.0041 
  Pr2 -0.04 ** 0.0208  0.08 *** 0.0280  0.21 *** 0.0203 
  Constant -8.97 *** 0.7524  -6.00 *** 0.7873  -2.58 *** 0.6423 
  σ2 0.10 *** 0.0014  0.10 *** 0.0013  0.07 *** 0.0010 
3. Private hospital part time            
  Female -0.05  0.1631  0.00  0.0726  0.01  0.0865 
  Age -0.01  0.0081  0.00  0.0053  0.01 *** 0.0048 
  20 or more years of education -  -  0.83 *** 0.1658  0.03  0.1209 
  Missing education -0.13  0.1136  -0.05  0.1074  -0.18 * 0.0965 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner) 0.07  0.1633  -0.11  0.0909  -0.08  0.1196 
  Less central and central municipalities 0.03  0.1011  -0.16 ** 0.0795  -0.06  0.0998 
  Pr3 -0.07  0.2467  -0.08  0.0897  0.08  0.1172 
  Constant 14.67  14.8227  6.52  10.0741  -21.05 ** 9.0004 
  σ3 0.16 *** 0.0189  0.11 *** 0.0300  0.16 *** 0.0170 
4. Private hospital fulltime            
  Female -0.09 ** 0.0477  -0.13 ** 0.0577  -0.05  0.0605 
  Age 0.00  0.0024  0.00  0.0028  0.01 ** 0.0030 
  20 or more years of education 0.10  0.0777  0.07  0.1040  0.08  0.1641 
  Missing education -0.28 *** 0.0932  -0.21 ** 0.0891  -0.23 ** 0.1034 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner) 0.13 * 0.0761  0.12  0.1193  0.13  0.1714 
  Less central and central municipalities 0.00  0.0467  -0.03  0.0607  -0.01  0.0717 
  Pr4 -0.34 ** 0.1422  -0.05  0.1431  -0.04  0.1555 
  Constant -2.71  4.8382  3.12  5.5480  -7.82  5.9511 
  σ4 0.06 *** 0.0165  0.15 *** 0.0106  0.15 *** 0.0165 
5. Public health care part time            
  Female -0.01  0.0145  -0.03 * 0.0156  -0.01  0.0144 
  Age 0.01 *** 0.0008  0.00 *** 0.0008  0.00 *** 0.0007 
  20 or more years of education 0.24 ** 0.1073  0.14 * 0.0836  0.12 ** 0.0551 
  Missing education 0.02  0.0256  0.05 ** 0.0266  0.05 ** 0.0253 
  Least central municipalities (kommuner) 0.04 ** 0.0177  0.03  0.0184  0.05 *** 0.0179 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.01  0.0151  -0.02  0.0160  -0.01  0.0151 
  Pr5 0.08 *** 0.0228  0.08 *** 0.0284  0.08 *** 0.0281 
  Constant -4.56 *** 1.6114  -0.77  1.6033  -2.20  1.4163 
  σ5 0.14 *** 0.0038  0.15 *** 0.0041  0.16 *** 0.0038 
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Table B.6. Part 2. Estimated coefficients of the wage equations for physicians 1997 – 1999.  
         
  1997   1998   1999 
 Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
6. Public health care fulltime            
  Female -0.02  0.0159  -0.03  0.0224  0.00  0.0177 
  Age 0.00 *** 0.0010  0.00  0.0024  0.00 *** 0.0012 
  20 or more years of education 0.20  0.1309  0.31 * 0.1648  0.05  0.0572 
  Missing education -0.01  0.0240  -0.02  0.0316  0.00  0.0274 
  Least central municipalities 
(kommuner) -0.04 ** 0.0169  -0.05 ** 0.0214  -0.02  0.0175 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.05 *** 0.0173  -0.05 *** 0.0212  -0.04 ** 0.0179 
  Pr6 0.07  0.0439  0.18 * 0.1014  0.05  0.0502 
  Constant -0.47  2.1237  0.52  4.9798  -2.78  2.4181 
  σ6 0.10 *** 0.0041  0.12 *** 0.0051  0.11 *** 0.0042 
7. Private health care part time            
  Female 0.02  0.0426  0.05  0.0640  0.10  0.0655 
  Age 0.00  0.0024  0.01  0.0034  0.00  0.0030 
  20 or more years of education -0.20  0.1730  0.29  0.1841  0.00  0.1583 
  Missing education 0.04  0.0546  0.04  0.0950  -0.05  0.0777 
  Least central municipalities 
(kommuner) 0.02  0.0525  0.12  0.0906  0.08  0.0846 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.02  0.0324  0.04  0.0531  -0.02  0.0497 
  Pr7 -0.05 * 0.0277  0.00  0.0508  -0.01  0.0521 
  Constant 5.28  4.7202  -5.22  6.6547  -0.31  5.7537 
  σ7 0.11 *** 0.0082  0.20 *** 0.0139  0.19 *** 0.0128 
8. Private health care fulltime            
  Female 0.01  0.0677  0.04  0.0773  -0.15  0.0988 
  Age 0.01 *** 0.0034  0.01 *** 0.0034  0.02 *** 0.0038 
  20 or more years of education 0.03  0.1833  0.30 * 0.1558  0.12  0.1671 
  Missing education -0.19  0.1344  -0.07  0.1116  -0.09  0.1527 
  Least central municipalities 
(kommuner) -0.03  0.0996  -0.10  0.0956  -0.03  0.1240 
  Less central and central municipalities -0.01  0.0602  -0.02  0.0626  -0.03  0.0661 
  Pr8 -0.08  0.0680  -0.02  0.0685  -0.08  0.0742 
  Constant 
-
16.55 ** 6.5453  
-
16.87 ** 6.6242  
-
25.12 *** 7.5477 
  σ8 0.18 *** 0.0130  0.20 *** 0.0141  0.23 *** 0.0156 
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime          
  Female -0.02 * 0.0134  -0.01  0.0132  -0.02 * 0.0122 
  Age 0.01 *** 0.0007  0.01 *** 0.0006  0.01 *** 0.0006 
  20 or more years of education 0.08 *** 0.0210  -0.01  0.0212  -0.01  0.0206 
  Missing education -0.02  0.0194  0.00  0.0199  0.01  0.0203 
  Least central municipalities 
(kommuner) 0.03  0.0235  0.05 ** 0.0216  0.04 * 0.0209 
  Less central and central municipalities 0.01  0.0126  0.05 *** 0.0123  0.02 ** 0.0121 
  Pr9 0.05 ** 0.0245  0.09 *** 0.0316  0.10 *** 0.0333 
  Constant -8.55 *** 1.3370  -6.87 *** 1.2055  -8.16 *** 1.1021 
  σ9 0.14 *** 0.0031  0.14 *** 0.0031  0.13 *** 0.0030 
            
κ1 0.02  0.0216  -0.01  0.0137  0.00  0.0086 
κ 2 0.00  0.0055  0.00  0.0049  0.00  0.0033 
κ 3 -0.02  0.0733  0.10  0.0963  -0.04  0.0873 
κ 4 -0.23 *** 0.0167  0.00  0.0755  -0.11 * 0.0541 
κ 5 0.00  0.0091  0.00  0.0091  0.00  0.0093 
κ 6 0.00  0.0095  0.00  0.0117  0.00  0.0099 
κ 7 0.00  0.0247  -0.01  0.0369  0.00  0.0353 
κ 8 0.00  0.0661  -0.01  0.0567  -0.02  0.0667 
κ 9 0.00  0.0091  -0.01  0.0084  0.00  0.0077 
            
Number observations   8965    9547    10349 
Log likelihood   
-
46173.26    
-
49472.67    
-
51931.58 
Wald chi2(81)   244.65    304.37    572.85 
            
*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval ** statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval 
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* statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval   
-  not possible to estimate either because of multicolinearity or lack of observations with the relevant characteristic 
The base category with regard to the dummy variables is male physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and living in an 
especially centralized region.   
Table B.7 shows the mean and predicted hourly wages for physicians derived from predictions 
for all physicians using the estimated wage equations. As expected, the predicted wages have 
less variation than the observed (any type of estimation/prediction will result in a smoothing 
of the data). 
Table B.7. Mean and median predicted hourly wages for physicians. Norwegian kroner.  
            
  1997    1998    1999  
 Mean Std. Dev. Median  Mean Std. Dev. Median  Mean Std. Dev. Median 
1. Public hospital part time            
  Observed 203 136.53 166  205 166.60 172  191 145.88 169 
  Predicted 186 33.23 180  182 30.74 176  174 27.15 168 
2. Public hospital fulltime            
  Observed 186 48.98 176  190 47.70 181  183 37.44 181 
  Predicted 180 16.94 179  185 16.44 184  181 14.88 180 
3. Private hospital part time            
  Observed 201 132.19 173  214 79.50 188  198 81.92 173 
  Predicted 187 18.69 189  212 59.92 203  191 24.34 187 
4. Private hospital fulltime            
  Observed 226 65.78 217  228 77.49 206  243 83.62 221 
  Predicted 223 27.00 223  226 24.76 227  242 30.55 238 
5. Public health care part time           
  Observed 156 59.00 157  162 71.74 166  160 57.43 166 
  Predicted 158 11.55 158  166 12.84 166  165 13.34 164 
6. Public health care fulltime           
  Observed 160 30.63 166  167 37.82 172  169 34.16 172 
  Predicted 166 10.51 166  174 15.90 173  175 11.89 175 
7. Private health care part time           
  Observed 168 50.18 160  188 148.40 169  192 120.98 169 
  Predicted 164 10.35 163  186 20.11 185  183 17.82 182 
8. Private health care fulltime           
  Observed 155 63.54 147  167 70.56 158  188 89.08 174 
  Predicted 157 20.71 151  172 27.81 172  191 35.47 184 
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime          
  Observed 168 67.00 166  167 59.88 169  169 62.31 169 
  Predicted 168 17.62 166  169 16.30 168  171 16.70 170 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
